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FOREWORD 
Why anti-pollution taz increases do happen in  such a discontinuous way, 
ezcluding more progressive continuous evolution which looks more rational ? 
Why does it happen in  the last moment, long before it could be ample- 
mented ? 
Why do some taz rates, once chosen, look to be locked-in forever ? 
These are some questions - high in IIASA's agenda - that viability 
theory attempts to answer. 
W e  shall present in  the first section the main feature and objectives of 
viability theory and a nontechnical presentation of its main concepts. We  
then devote the second section to a very simple model describing possible 
antipollution tax policies to regulate polluting production i n  face of demand, 
illustrating the general concepts introduced in  the first section. 
Several lessons can be dmwn from this ezample. For instance, a same 
recipe (keep the taz constant) can have opposite consequences on the growth 
of production. A second one is that the intuition elaborated in  a static frame- 
work may sometimes mislead us when evolution is present, by suggesting that 
such or such result, which makes sense in  a static world, may have perverse 
eflects in  a dynamic one. 
But it is forbidden to dmw more conclusions than these modest models 
conceal. However, i f  a given reasoning is not validated in the case of such a 
simple model, it will not be valid in  a more complez one. 
Ant i-Pollut ion Tax Policy: a Viability Approach 
Jean-Pierre Aubin 
1 Contingency and Viability of Systems 
Viability theory is a mathematical theory1 that  offers mathematical metaphors 
of evolution of macrosystems under contingent uncertainty arising in biol- 
ogy, economics, cognitive sciences, games, and similar areas. It concerns 
specifically macrosystems, which are systems the variable of which are di- 
vided into two categories: 
1. the state variables, which constitute the components of the state of the 
system, on which act the agents, actors, decision-makers, etc. of the 
system, 
2. the regulee, or regulation controls 
The difference between states and regulees is that  if we do know the 
agents (biochemical mechanisms in biology, economic agents in economics, 
individuals or  actors in sociology and cognitive individuals in cognitive sci- 
ences) acting on the states (phenotypes in biology, commodities in eco- 
nomics, behaviors in sociology and sensori-motor states in cognitive sci- 
ences), we do not know - or we assume that  we do not know - the agents 
governing the evolution of the regulee, which may be 
'Viability Theory is the theme of the essay La mort du devin, l'e'mergence du de'miurge, 
the purpose of which is to  divulgate this mathematical theory motivated by the common 
features shared by many biological, economic, social and cognitive systems. The book 
Contingence et viabilite' des sys t tmes,  with a more academic flavor, provides a more rigor- 
ous account of the concepts and the results of this theory and its biological, economic and 
cognitive motivations. The  general mathematical theory is presented in Viability The- 
ory,  (1991) Birkhiuser. This theory is based on set-valued analysis - which was for a 
large part motivated by viability theory - presented in Set-Valued Analysis by HClPne 
Frankowska and the author, (1990) Birkhiuser. The  book Neuml Networks and Quali- 
tative Physics: A Viability Approach, Cambridge University Press, (1994) applies these 
mathematical tools to  two important domains of Artificial Intelligence and the monograph 
Dynamic Economic Theory: A Viability Approach is devoted to the 'economicn version 
of this theory. 
1 .  genotypes or fitness matrices in genetics and population genetics (when 
the evolution of phenotypes of a population is regulated by sexual 
reproduction and mutations), 
2. prices or other fiduciary g o d s  in economics (when the evolution of 
commodities and services is regulated by Adam Smith's invisible hand 
or the market, the planning bureau, . . . ), 
3. cultural codes in sociology (when the evolution of societies is regulated 
by every individual believing and obeying such codes), 
4 .  conceptual regulees or synaptic matrices in pattern recognition mecha- 
nisms and neural networks (when the sensory-motor state is regulated 
by learning processes), etc.. 
In the example below, the state of the system is a commodity produced 
by a polluting process, and the refulee would be taxes to  stimulate or slow- 
down production of this commodity. 
If it is safe to  posint in firts approximation that entrepreneurs govern 
the evolution of production, it is more delicate t o  assume than a given 
decision maker could pilot the evolution of taxes: agencies are mad of so 
many constituants that  it is no longer possible to  identify such a political 
agency with an actual decision maker. We propose instead t o  assume that  
it behaves as a regularoty mechanism, and not as a planner. 
But then, if there are no longer actors who steer the regulee, it becomes 
impossible to  forecast the future of the system, leaving room to  "chance" that  
the vocation of science is to  extrude, to  a freedom of evolution that  viability 
must master. 
We shall specifically be concerned with three main common features: 
A nondeterministic (or contingent) engine of evolution, providing sev- 
eral (and even many) opportunities to  explore the environment, 
r Viability constraints that  the state of the system must obey a t  each 
instant under "death penaltyn, 
r An inertia principle stating that the "regulees" of the system are 
changed only when viability is at  stake. 
The first two features are best summarized by the deeply intuitive state- 
ment attributed to  Democritus by Jacques Monod: "Everything that ezists 
Table 1: States and Regulees in some Systems 
in the Universe is due to Chance and Necessity". The inertia principle is 
a mathematical formulation of the concept of punctuated equilibrium intro- 
duced recently in paleontology by Elredge and Gould. It runs against the 
teleological trend assigning aims to  be achieved (in even an optimal way) 
by the state of the system and the belief that actors regulee the system for 
such purposes. 
Field 
Economics 
biological 
evolution 
sociology 
cogni- 
sciences 
- Nondeterminism: We shall mean by this term that  there is a 
large variety of possible evolutions. 
In our simple example below, there as many feasible evolutions as tax 
amounts. 
State 
Commodities 
phenotypes 
behaviors 
of individuals 
sensori-motor 
states 
In other words, les jeux ne sont jamais faits, in the sense that  a t  each 
instant, there are several available, or feasible, evolutions which depend 
upon the state, or even the history of the evolution of the state of the 
system up to  this time. Therefore, the concept of evolution borrowed from 
Newtonian mechanics is no longer adequate for such systems. It has led to  
Regulee 
physical 
commodities 
genotypes 
cultural 
codes 
conceptual 
codes 
the misleading identification of mathematics with a deterministic paradigm, 
which implies that  the evolution of macrosystems can be predicted. Even 
Viability 
fiduciary 
viability 
sociability 
adaptabi- 
lity 
if we were to  accept the existence of deterministic mechanisms2 underlying 
Actor 
consumers and 
producers 
biochemical 
mechanisms 
individuals 
orga- 
nisms 
the evolution of biological, economic and social macrosystems, we know 
that  such systems often can be inherently unstable - and this places the 
actual computation of their solutions beyond the capabilities of even the 
' ~ n d  now we discover that some of our "perfectly deterministicn models can exhibit 
all sorts of different trajectories. These are chaotic systems, making prediction virtually 
impossible. 
most sophisticated of present-day computers! To "run" models which have 
some inbuilt structural instability can serve no useful purpose. 
Thus, we suppose here that  the dynamics responsible for the evolution 
are not deterministic. This lack of determinism has many different features: 
i t  may be due t o  nonstochastic "uncertaintyn3, to  "disturbancesnand "per- 
turbations" of various kinds, or to errors in the replicating systems in the 
course of evolution. 
In many instances, the dynamics of the system are related to  certain 
"regulees" , which, in turn, are restricted by state-dependent constraints 
(closed systems.) 
The systems made of living being have often a propensity to  create, 
maintain or enlarge their own variability, multiplying possibilities, combin- 
ing them, crossing them. This si the polymorphism in population genetics, 
the investment in flexibility in economics, where the number of fiduciary 
commodities increases every day, testing and exploring behaviors, multiply- 
ing the assumptions in cognitive processes and matching them, etc. 
- Viability: For a variety of reasons, not all evolutions are possible. 
This amounts to saying that  the state of the system must obey constraints, 
called viability constraints. 
In our example below, the commodity to  be produced must meet a de- 
mand, production constraints and limitations of the pollution caused by the 
production process. 
In other examples, these constraints include homeostatic constraints in 
biological regulation, scarcity constraints in economics, s tate constraints in 
regulee, power constraints in game theory, ecological constraints in genetics, 
sociability constraints in sociology, etc. Therefore, the goal is t o  select so- 
lutions which are viable in the sense that they satisfy, at each instant, these 
constraints. 
Viability theorems thus yield selection procedures of viable evolutions, 
i.e., characterize the connections between the dynamics and the constraints 
for guaranteeing the existence of a t  least one viable solution starting from 
any initial state. These theorems also provide the regulation processes 
'No a priori knowledge of an underlying probability law on the state of events is made. 
Fuzzy viability provides models where the available velocities can be ranked through a 
membership cost function to take into account that some velocities are more likely to be 
chosen than others. 
(feedbacks4) tha t  maintain viability, or, even as time goes by, improve the 
state according t o  some preference relation. 
Nonetheless, selection through viability constraints may not be discrim- 
inating enough. Starting from any state a t  any instant, several viable so- 
lutions may be implemented by the system, including equilibria, which are 
stationary evolutions5. 
Thus further selection mechanisms need t o  be devised or discovered. We 
advocate here a third feature t o  which a selection procedure must comply, 
the Inertia Principle. 
- Inertia Principle: Since we assumed that  no actors (or too 
many of them) govern the evolution of the regulees, the Inertia Principle 
states that  "the regulees are kept constant as long as viability of the system 
is not at stake". 
As long as the state of the system lies in the interior of the viability 
set (the set of states satisfying viability constraints), any regularity regulee 
will work. Therefore, the system can maintain the regulee inherited from 
the past. This happens if the system obeys the inertia principle. Since 
the state of the system may evolve while the regulee remains constant, it 
may reach the viability boundary with an "outward" velocity. This event 
corresponds t o  a period of crisis: To survive, the system must find another 
regulatory regulee such that  the new associated velocity forces the solution 
back inside the viability set. Alternatively, if the viability constraints can 
evolve, another way to  resolve the crisis is to relax the constraints so that  
the state of the system lies in the interior of the new viability set. When this 
is not possible, strategies for structuml change fail: by design, this means 
the solution leaves the viability set and "dies". 
Naturally, there are several procedures for selecting a viable regulee when 
viability is a t  stake. For instance, the selection a t  each instant of the regulees 
providing viable evolutions with minimal velocity is an example that  obeys 
'thus providing the central concept of cybernetics as a solution to the regulation 
problem. 
'This touches on another aspect of viability theory - that concerned with complexity 
and robustness: It may be observed that the state of the system becomes increasingly 
robust the further it is from the boundary of the viability set. Therefore, after some time 
has elapsed, only the parts of the trajectories furthest away from the viability boundary 
will remain. This fact may explain the apparent discontinuities (Urnissing linksn) and 
hierarchical organization arising from evolution in certain systems. 
this inertia principle. They are called "heavy" viable evolutions6 in the sense 
of heavy trends in economics. 
Heavy viable evolutions can be viewed as providing mathematical metaphors 
for the  concept of punctuated equilibrium7 introduced recently in paleontol- 
ogy by Elredge and Gould. 
When the viability constraints are not consistent with the uncertain 
dynamics of the system, viability theory establishes the existence of the 
viability kernel, which is the subset of the states from which starts a t  least 
one viable evolution. This concept happens to  be fundamental, and its 
properties are actively being investigated and algorithms are devised. 
In particular, the viability kernel of the macrosystems under constant 
regulee (or zero inflation) is called the viability niche of the regulee. A regulee 
the viability niche of which is not empty is called a punctuated equilibrium. 
It is an  equilibrium if the viability niche is reduced t o  an element, which is 
then the equilibrium. 
Viability niches are locked-in by heavy evolutions: if an evolution enters 
the viability niche of a punctuated equilibrium, i t  remains in i t  forever. 
In a nutshell, the main purpose of viability theory is to explain the evo- 
lution of a system, determined by given nondeterministic dynamics and vi- 
ability constraints, to reveal the concealed feedbacks which allow the system 
to be regulated and provide selection mechanisms for implementing them. 
It assumes implicitly an "opportunistic" and "conservative" behavior of 
the system: a behavior which enables the system t o  keep viable solutions as 
long as its potential for exploration (or its lack of determinism) - described 
by the availability of several evolutions - makes possible its regulation. 
'When the regulees are the velocities, heavy solutions are the ones with minimal ac- 
celeration, i.e., maximal inertia. 
7Excavations a t  Kenya's Lake Turkana have provided clear evidence of evolution from 
one species to  another. The  rock s trata  there contain a series of fossils tha t  show every 
small s tep of an evolution journey that  seems to have proceeded in fits and starts.  Exam- 
ination of more than 3,000 fossils by P. Williamson showed how 13 species evolved. The  
record indicated that  the animals stayed much the same for immensely long stretches of 
time. But twice, about two million years ago and then, 700,000 years ago, the pool of life 
seemed t o  explode - set off, apparently, by a drop in the lake's water level. Intermediate 
forms appeared very quickly, new species evolving in 5,000 t o  50,000 years, after millions 
of years of constancy, leading paleontologists to  challenge the accepted idea of continuous 
evolution. 
Contrary t o  optimal control theory, viability theory does not require 
any single decision-maker (or actor, or player) t o  uguiden the system by 
optimizing an intertemporal optimality criterion8. 
Furthermore, the  choice (even conditional) of the controls is not made 
once and for all a t  some initial time, but they can be changed at each instant 
so as to take into account possible modifications of the environment of the 
system, allowing therefore for adaptation t o  viability constraints. 
Finally, by not appealing to  intertemporal criteria, viability theory does 
not require any knowledge of the futureg (even of a stochastic nature.) This 
is of particular importance when experimentationlo is not possible or when 
the phenomenon under study is not periodic. For example, in biological evo- 
lution as well as in economics and in the other systems we shall investigate, 
the dynamics of the system disappear and cannot be recreated. 
Hence, forecasting or prediction of the future are not the issues which are 
not addressed by viability theory. 
However, the conclusions of the theorems allow us to  reduce the choice of 
possible evolutions, or t o  single out impossible future events, or to provide 
explanation of some behaviors which do not fit any reasonable optimality 
criterion. 
Therefore, instead of using intertemporal optimization" that  involves 
the future, viability theory provides selection procedures of viable evolutions 
obeying, a t  each instant, s tate constraints which depend upon the present or 
the past. (This does not exclude anticipations, which are extrapolations of 
past evolutions, constraining in the last analysis the  evolution of the  system 
t o  be a function of its history.) 
'the choice of which is open t o  question even in static models, even when multicriteria 
or several decision makers are involved in the model. 
'Most systems we investigate do involve myopic behavior; while they cannot take into 
account the future, they are certainly constrained by the past. 
''Experimentation, by assuming that  the evolution of the s tate  of the system starting 
from a given initial s ta te  for a same period of time will be the same whatever the initial 
time, allows one t o  translate the time interval back and forth, and, thus, t o  "know" the 
future evolution of the system. 
"which can be traced back t o  Sumerian mythology which is a t  the origin of Genesis: 
one Decision-Maker, deciding what is good and bad and choosing the best (fortunately, on 
an intertemporal basis, thus wisely postponing to eternity the verification of optimality), 
knowing the future, and having taken the optimal decisions, well, during one week ... 
2 Example: Controlling product ion through anti- 
pollution taxes 
We illustrate the concept of viable and heavy solution in the case of a simple 
dynamical model (production regulated by anti-pollution taxes). The only 
advantage of these crude models is to  provide a graphical description of some 
results and t o  compare, mutatis mutandis, the evolutions of the production 
and of the tax. 
Let K := [a, b] be the subset of commodities x produced by a polluting 
process. The lower bound a represents the minimum production needed 
to  satisfy the basic needs of consumers. The production process causing 
pollution, the upper bound b denotes the amount of production generating 
the maximal production tolerated. Hence the viability constraint impose 
the amount of production t o  evolve between these two bounds. 
The velocity g(x(t)) with which production evolves is assumed to  be posi- 
tive. In this case, the production increases according t o  the differential equa- 
tion xl(t) = g(x(t)) and will exceed the upper bound set by anti-pollution 
policy. 
A mechanism is needed t o  slow down the production. The one we re- 
tain here penalizes the production velocity by a nonnegative tax  p(t): the 
actual production velocity is the difference between the above velocity and 
a function proportional to  the tax. In other words, the dynamical system 
corrected by taxes is described by 
and where h(x) 2 0. 
2.1 Equilibria and Bifurcations 
First, we can single out the taxes associated with equilibria: they are the 
ones for which the velocity vanishes (since an equilibrium is a stationary 
state). If we suppose that  - '(') is defined for all x E K ,  then f : x - p = 
~ ( 2 )  
f (x) is the map associating with any production the tax  for which i t  is an 
equilibrium. Its graph is called the equilibrium curve. 
We are more interested by the inverse of this map, which associates with 
any tax  the (possibly empty) set of equilibria for this tax. 
In the case of figure 1, this set is empty if the tax is either smaller than p~ 
or larger than p ~ .  At p~ appears a bifurcation: there exists an equilibrium 

z~ which gives birth t o  two equilibria when the tax lies between p~ and 
PA. At PA, a third equilibrium appears, and there are three equilibria in 
this example when p ranges over the interval ]pA,pB[. We find again two 
equilibria when p €]pB,pF[ and only one a t  p ~ .  In this example, there are 
four bifurcation taxes, p ~ ,  PA, p~ and p ~ .  
Below the equilibrium curve, one notices that the production velocities 
are always positive, and negative above. Hence the two increasing branches 
AF and EB of the equilibrium curve are made of unstable equilibria. Indeed, 
for a given tax,  whether the initial production is slightly a t  the right or the 
left of the equilibrium, the production goes away from the equilibrium t o  
the right and to  the left respectively. Such equilibria are repellers. 
Symmetrically, the decreasing branch F E  of the equilibrium curve is 
made of stable equilibria. Indeed, for a given tax, whether the initial pro- 
duction is slightly a t  the right or the left of the equilibrium, the production 
goes towards to  the equilibrium from the left and from the right respectively. 
Such equilibria are actually attractors, since the productions starting nearby 
converge monotonically t o  such equilibria. 
Equilibria E and F are called saddle points: attractors in one direction, 
repellers in the other. 
2.2 The Regulation Map 
Actually, in an evolutionary perspective, we are not interested by equilibria 
and their stability, but by the evolution of both taxes and productions which 
comply the demand-versus-pollution constraint. 
The (set-valued) pricing map nK which associates with production z the 
set of viable taxes: if the production is equal t o  a ,  a nonnegative velocity 
is required t o  reniew with growth, and this is possible with taxes ranging 
between 0 and PA. 
If the production belongs to  the open interval ]a,  b[, then all taxes are 
possible because, for short periods, the production can increase or decrease 
without leaving the interval. 
Finally, when the production is equal to  b, nonpositive velocities are 
required to  slow it  down, and this happens with taxes larger than or equal 
to  PB. 
In other words, the taxation map is defined by 
nA'(a) = [O,PA], ~ K ( z )  = [O, m [  when a < z < b & nK(b)  = [pB, + m [  
This taxation map, being set-valued, is not deterministic: i t  leaves the 
possibility to  errors. It imposes sufficiently low taxes when the lower bound 
is reached and sufficiently high when the upper bound is achieved. 
The taxation map guides the evolution of taxes through the regulation 
law 
for all t > 0, p(t) E n ~ ( z ( t ) )  
It dictates what one must a t  least do to  choose the taxes in order to  
comply the demand-versus-pollution constraints. 
On can devise a multitude of "planning" mechanisms which are consis- 
tent with this regulation maps: planning mechanisms are selections n (z )  E 
n K ( z )  of the taxation map used as feedbacks for which the differential equa- 
tion 
z'(t> = g(z(t)) - h(z( t ) )n(z( t ) )  
have solutions (which are necessarily viable). 
But using planning procedures is not the objective we pursue: we wish 
t o  show how the inertia principle works on this example. 
2.3 Viability Niches 
Consider an  initial production-tax pair below the equilibrium curve. Then, 
keeping the tax constant, the velocity remains nonnegative and the produc- 
tion grows up. 
At constant tax, the interval [a,  b] is not necessarily viable. The viability 
kernel of our dynamical system regulated by taxes is, by definition, the 
largest viability domain contained in the interval. 
Take for instance a tax smaller than p ~ .  The production grows to  the 
upper bound b which it reaches with a positive velocity, so that  it violates 
the demand-versus-pollution constraint in finite time. The viability niche of 
such tax is thus empty. When the tax is p ~ ,  the viability niche is reduced 
t o  the equilibrium z ~ .  When the tax lies between p~ and PA, i ts  viability 
niche is the interval the lower bound of which is a and the upper bound 
is the unstable equilibrium associated with this tax. The associated stable 
equilibrium is then an attractor of this system under constant tax  in the 
niche. 
When the tax ranges over ]pA,pB[, its viability niche is the interval 
lying between the smallest unstable equilibrium and the largest unstable 
equilibrium, the stable equilibrium being an attractor of this system under 
constant tax. Between p~ and p ~ ,  the viability niche is the interval whose 
lower bound is the unstable interval and the upper bound is b. Finally, for 
p ~ ,  the viability niche is made of the equilibrium z ~ .  
If the initial production is outside of the viability niche of a given tax 
(which is always the case when its viability niche is empty), then the produc- 
tion evolving under constant tax shall violate the demand-versus-pollution 
constraint in finite time, either by traversing the upper bound if the tax is 
below the equilibrium curve, or by going below the lower bound a if the tax 
is above. 
When the production reaches the upper bound b, one must increase at 
once the tax above the tax pg prescribed by the taxation map. Or, if the 
tax is above the equilibrium tax, it must decrease ruggedly the tax below 
PA- 
A first lesson can be drawn from this example: a same recipe - maintain 
the tax constant - can produce strictly antagonistic consequences - increase 
of decrease production. 
A second lesson is the danger caused by the inertia principle: when the 
production reaches the boundary of the interval, only discontinuous changes 
(impulses) can maintain the viability of the system. 
2.4 Dilatory and Stimulative Solutions 
When the initial production-tax pair is below the equilibrium curve and the 
initial production outside the viability niche of the tax, on can slow down 
production by increasing taxes a t  a fixed velocity, say equal to  some c 2 0 
(in other words, the tax increases proportionally to time). Such solutions 
are called dilatory. 
In this case, the production-tax pair ranges over a trajectory such as 
the curve CD12. This curve is increasing above the equilibrium curve, cuts 
vertically this equilibrium curve and is decreasing above. Starting from the 
"These curves are the trajectories of the solutions p! to  the differential equation 
As functions p  c z = p ! ( p ) ,  they are increasing when the right-hand side is positive, i .e. ,  
below the equilibrium curve, vanish when they cross the equilibrium curve and decreasing 
above. 
Indeed, when p ( t )  is a solution to the differential equation p l ( t )  = r ( z ( t ) , p ( t ) ) ,  then the 
solution z ( t )  := p ( p ( t ) )  to the differential equation 
point C, both production and tax increase until the productions reaches its 
maximum and decreases, while the tax continues to  grow up. 
All the trajectories of dilatory production-tax pairs share the same be- 
havior and do not cross. 
We obtain the symmetric situation when the initial production-tax pair is 
below the equilibrium curve and the initial production is outside i ts  viability 
niche. The production is accelerated by diminishing taxes a t  a constant 
velocity, say -d. Such solutions are called stimulative13. In this case, the 
production-tax pair ranges over a trajectory such as the curve G H .  This 
curve is decreasing below the equilibrium curve, crosses it vertically and 
increasing above. Starting from H ,  both production and tax decrease until 
the production achieves its minimum and increases again, while the tax 
continuous to  go down. 
2.5 Bounded Tax Changes 
One may reject constant tax scenarii as exceptional and thus, the rigid form 
of the inertia principle which may lead t o  brutal discontinuities (impulses) 
of taxes to  maintain the viability of the system when the boundary of the 
interval is reached. But, when one thinks about i t ,  it is not the inertia 
principle which has to  be disregarded, but the primitive aspect of i t ,  which 
does not forbid impulses, i.e., discontinuous mutations of taxes. 
So, we add another assumption to this model: taxes must respect speed 
limits. In other words, one imposes bounds t o  tax changes: the tax veloc- 
ity must remain between bounds -d and +c. Therefore, the evolution of 
satisfies 
In the case of dilatory solutions p! ,  one takes r ( z , p )  = c. 
131n the case of stimulative solutions p i ,  one takes r ( z , p )  = -d. These curves are then 
the trajectories of the solutions to the differential equation 
As functions p  I- z  = p ; ( p ) ,  they are decreasing above the equilibrium curve, vanish when 
they cross it and increasing below. 
production-tax pairs is governed by the system of differential inclusions 
i) z l ( t )  = g ( z ( t ) )  - h ( z ( t ) ) p ( t )  where ~ ( t )  L 0 
( 2 . 3 )  
i i )  and - d < p f ( t )  < +c 
The model becomes more complicated t o  solve, and one cannot guess 
what is the new taxation map. On can envision that  if the production is 
near the boundary with a tax such that  the production-tax is below the 
equilibrium curve, i t  would be impossible to keep the production inside 
the interval without taxes violating the speed limit. This is because the 
old taxation map, valid for systems without speed limits, is no longer a 
taxation map for the system ( 2 . 3 )  completed by speed limits on taxes, i.e., 
under bounded tax change. 
However, in this example, one can describe the new taxation map taking 
into account the bounded tax change14. 
For each production, the taxes must range between the part of the dila- 
tory trajectory below the equilibrium curve which goes through B and the 
part of the stimulative trajectory above the equilibrium curve which goes 
through A''. 
2.6 Heavy Evolutions 
A viable evolution is said to be heavy if the absolute value of the velocity of 
the viable tax is the smallest one. 
''Its graph is the viability kernel of the rectangle [a, b] x [O,+oo[ for the system of 
differential inclusions (2.3) 
15They are defined through the functions p! and p: which are the solutions to differential 
equations (2.1) and (2.2) going through B and A respectively. 
The  equations of the upper curve is equal to  
b 
r:(z) = p if and only if z = pd(p) 
and the lower one is equal to  
r!(z) = 0 if 0 5 z 5 p!(0) 
r!(z) = p if and only if z = p!(p) when p!(0) < z 5 b 
The  new taxation map associates with any production z the taxes p such that  
The  growth properties of the functions r and p are exchanged, since one is the inverse of 
the other. 
Let us begin by analyzing the case when the initial production-tax pair 
(zo, po) is below the equilibrium curve, but above the dilatory curve going 
through B (which is the lower boundary of the graph of the new pricing 
rule) . 
If the initial production zo belongs t o  the viability niche of the initial 
tax po, we already saw that  i t  converges t o  the stable equilibrium associated 
with po, and thus, a heavy solution par ezcellence. If not, when the initial 
production is outside the viability niche of po, the production increases while 
the tax  remains constant, so that  the trajectory of the production-tax pair is 
horizontal. This works until i t  hits the dilatory curve going through B (for 
a production smaller than the upper bound 6). Then, and only then, the 
tax  starts t o  evolve with the smallest velocity. A simple computation shows 
that  there is only one viable tax velocity, equal t o  +c.  The production-tax 
pair ranges over now the dilatory curve until the moment when i t  achieves 
the equilibrium B. Being an heavy solution, i t  remains a t  this equilibrium. 
We thus built the heavy solution to  the nondeterministic system (2.1). 
Hence, the region comprised between the dilatory curve going though B 
and the equilibrium curve is contained in the viability kernel of the system 
(2.3) under bounded tax change. 
We also remark that  the upper bound B is then locked-in by every heavy 
solution starting from a production-tax pair below the equilibrium pair and 
above the dilatory curve going through B ,  when xo does not belong to  the 
viability niche of po (otherwise, the stable equilibrium associated with po is 
locked-in). 
If the tax  is maintained constant after crossing the dilatory curve going 
through B ,  it is impossible t o  maintain a viable production with an  tax 
increase below c .  Indeed, let R := (Z,po) such a point. By braking the 
production by taking the highest tax velocity, the production-tax pair ranges 
over an  dilatory curve below the one which passes through B ,  and which 
does not cross it .  Therefore, the production reaches b a t  finite time with a 
positive velocity, since the tax is smaller than p ~ .  The solution is not viable. 
The situation is even worse for any other velocity -d 5 p' 5 c .  
In other words, the speed limit on taxes conceals a warning signal to  the 
agency deciding taxes, which must starts to  increse taxes with the highest 
velocity as soon as the dilatory curve going through B is reached. Otherwise, 
they need a higher tax  increase bound cl t o  remain viable (the tax  increase 
cl is the one such that  the pair R := (3 ,po) lies in the trajectory associated 
with the dilatory curve associated with cl 2 c and going through B).  
The situation is completely symmetric if the initial production-tax pair 
is above the equilibrium tax and below the stimulative curve going through 
A. Production goes down under constant tax until the production-tax pair 
hits the stimulative curve going through A. Hence the tax  starts t o  decrease 
with velocity -d until the production-tax pair reaches the equilibrium A, a t  
which i t  remains forever. 
We observe a hysteresis phenomenon: if the tax  is too low, every heavy 
evolution starting outside its viability niche increases and reaches t o  the 
equilibrium B,  and if the tax  is too high, the heavy solution starting outside 
its viability niche reaches A. 
We therefore checked that  "viability" and "heaviness" suffice t o  deter- 
mine a solution t o  the nondeterministic system (2.1). 
2.7 Barrier Property 
A theorem due t o  Marc Quincampoix states that  the dilatory curve going 
through B and the stimulative curve going through A enjoy the barrier 
property: once one of these curves is hit by a production-tax pair, the evolution 
of the production-tax pair cannot leave it until it reaches one of the equilibrium 
A or B. In other words, on these two curves, the tax is doomed to  be equal 
either to  c or -d. Only heavy solutions can travel along these paths in order 
to  maintain the viability of the system. 
2.8 If an Agency Could Decide 
If an  agency could "really" command the evolution of taxes, he could de- 
sign other evolutions than the heavy ones which either converge t o  a stable 
equilibrium or locks-in one of the two equilibria A or B .  
It could, for instance, want to  reach the equilibrium B at  any cost. As- 
sume for instance that  it starts from the production-tax pair S (taken on the 
stimulative curve GH) above the equilibrium curve, where the production 
decreases. If the initial production does not belong t o  its viability niche, we 
saw that  the heavy solution would arrive a t  the unwanted equilibrium A. 
In order t o  reach B ,  he can travel the stimulative curve GH with the tax 
velocity -d as long as the production-tax pair does not reach the dilatory 
curve going through B. Despite tax reduction, the production continues t o  
decrease until it reaches its minimum when the stimulative curve GH crosses 
the equilibrium curve, contradicting the static intuition that  a stimulative 
policy would increase production. The production starts t o  increase only 
when the equilibrium curve is traversed, and then our agency must main- 
tain during some time his stimulative policy for increasing production, until 
the production-tax pair reaches the dilatory curve going through B. Then, 
he must ruggedly change its policy by adopting an dilatory policy so that 
the production-tax pair persists to grow while traveling this dilatory curve 
which leads the production-tax pair to  the desired equilibrium B. 
